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LEADERSHIP AND OPFOR NETWORKS

Robert J. Bunker

Leadership—the activity of leading others.
OPFOR—opposing or opposition force.
Networks—structures and processes that link personnel and/or organizations together.

This essay will address the topic of leadership and OPFOR networks. This subject area
has suffered from quite a bit of neglect yet has great homeland security potentials.1
For law enforcement purposes, this represents an important topic because gaining an
understanding of one’s opponents and their organizational and leadership approaches is the
first step in achieving mastery and dominance over them. The primary reason for the neglect of
this topic it is that it requires interdisciplinary knowledge concerning three distinct areas of
study— leadership, OPFORs, and networks— and their subsequent analytical fusion. It is the
intent of this essay to draw upon each of these areas of study and suggest strategies and
methods that may be used to better understand their interrelationships and possibly open new
lines of research. At the same time, when applicable, the focus will be upon how these may
pertain to the Al Qaeda network.
The purpose of leadership in conflict and war is to get others to follow orders and
directives, perform more effectively under fire, enhance personnel morale and, ultimately,
promote in others the ability to achieve feats beyond their normal capacity. All of these
capabilities are important to the functioning and ‘combat effectiveness’2 of non‐state OPFOR
networks engaging the law enforcement agencies and military forces of the United States.
A better understanding of the dynamics of leadership processes in OPFOR networks is
important not only to our ability to disrupt, neutralize, and dismantle them but to facilitate the
creation and development of our own allied operational networks. Line officers and police
supervisors outside of specialized units may find this topic somewhat esoteric but the post 9‐11
reality in which we now exist calls for all public safety officers and responders to begin to think
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and plan for the very really possibility of future strikes against our homeland. With awareness
of OPFOR patterns and functions comes our ability to develop new tactical and operational
response capabilities and the organizational and technology based requirements to support
them. Lessons learned concerning OPFOR leadership styles also provide us with an opportunity
to better appreciate our own perspectives on police leadership and further our understanding
of competing leadership models.

Types of OPFOR Leadership
Many different definitions and views on leadership exist. The bottom line, however, is
how the art and science of leading others impacts real world operations. Since OPFOR networks
exist for one singular purpose—to engage in conflict and war—we should view their leadership
processes from this perspective. Unfortunately, a “one‐size‐fits‐all” form of analysis does not
exist concerning these leadership processes. Here, we examine several which offer useful
insights for homeland security purposes.
One analytical method applicable to conflict and war is Clausewitz’s differentiation
between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of activity. Leadership types based on this
analytical method, with the inclusion of OPFOR examples, would be as follows:
Tactical Leaders. Based on individual tactics and procedures found at the fire team and
squad levels. OPFOR‐analogous positions are general terrorist cells and specialized units
such as suicide bomber groups, direct assault groups, and beheading crews. These are
low‐level operatives akin to non‐commissioned officers (NCOs) or police sergeants with
more specialized training. The three Al Qaeda members who served as pilots in the 9/11
attacks would fall into this category.
Operational Leaders. Based on the coordination of many tactical units into an ongoing
operation in large battlespace (operational space) areas. This can include military
theater operations taking place across a country or countries. Regional leaders of Al
Qaeda cells in the various regions of the world—such as Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi in Iraq
and Mohamed Atta, the Al Qaeda member who coordinated the four 9‐11 strike groups
— are examples of operational leaders. Interestingly, Atta also served as the 4th tactical
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leader for the 9‐11 attacks. Such blurring between operational leaders and tactical
leaders is not uncommon—this was also the case for Al‐Zarqawi who directly engaged in
beheadings. The reason for this overlap is that many radical Islamic leaders consider
themselves warriors rather than soldiers, thus no distinction is made between the
managers of violence (officers) and those that participate in it (enlisted troops) unlike in
the US military.
Strategic Leaders. This is the level of political officials, senior level military officers, and
police chiefs. These leaders set strategic and grand strategic goals and policies. For Al
Qaeda, Usuma bin Laden and his second in command Ayman al‐Zawahiri would be
examples of strategic leaders.
Shamil Basayev, the infamous and now deceased Chechen leader, is an outlier in that he
participated in all three levels of leadership activity. This would be tantamount to Usama Bin
Laden picking up an AK‐47 and both coordinating and engaging in school takeovers and aircraft
hijackings.
Another analytical method utilized is based on generational patterns of the leadership.
Such patterns can be derived from both the leaders themselves and the life cycle of an
organization. Leader‐based patterns can be viewed stemming from work conducted on the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).3 PIRA patterns are:
Early Founding Leaders. First generation leaders were from the working class and
veteran terrorists. They were street smart rather than educated and tended to be in
their 30s and 40s. As a result, they commanded great respect but were not charismatic
individuals. Examples are MacStiofain, McKee, O’Bradaigh, and O’Conail who emerged
from 1969‐1975.
Follow‐on and Continuity Leaders. Second generation leaders drew from both the
working and middle class. They joined PIRA, when formed, and were more capable
because of the benefits of universal education. These individuals were in their early 20s
and cults of personality formed around them. Examples are Adams, McGinnis, and
Sands, who emerged from 1978 to the present.
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Embryonic Leaders. Projected third generation leaders are now emerging but not yet
identified. While still drawing from the lower and middle classes, these individuals are
well educated up to and including holding graduate degrees. They are primarily
attracted to Shin Féin over PIRA. This group is in its 20s and 30s and can be viewed as
‘political constituency’ organizers as Northern Irish Catholics shift from a political
violence (i.e. terrorism) to political accommodation strategy.
Al Qaeda leadership patterns are also now appearing. Major firebreaks in Al Qaeda
organizational development can be noted from the early Mujahideen days in Afghanistan to the
formation of Al Qaeda and the full scale operating of its training camps in Afghanistan and then
again due to the post 9‐11 loss of those training camps and the new reliance upon the internet
for training and radicalization and the absorption of affiliated groups. These shifts all required
different forms of leadership development and effectiveness. It is noteworthy that 88%
percent of the Al Qaeda central staff leaders had finished college and 20% had doctorates.4 Its
leaders were far more educated, hence more capable of engaging in complex planning, from a
much earlier point in its OPFOR evolution than a group such as PIRA/Shin Féin that is only now
beginning to seek this level of education in its leadership. Still, with Al Qaeda’s globalization and
increasing incorporation of outside cells to the network (such as the Maghreb Arabs) the
average educational level of organization leadership is decreasing.5 It will be interesting to see
what impact this will have on overall organization development and effectiveness.
Further crossovers and overlaps with patterns of leadership and OPFOR development
can be derived from research conducted by this author on Weapons Systems Lifecycles. This
research has been used to characterize the lifecycles of the European knight and the modern
battle tank. A four‐stage process is articulated from the emergence of a system through its
dominance on the battlefield to its eventual obsolescence and discontinuation of use.
Lifecycles research also has applicability to terrorists and other types of OPFORs such as
insurgents, non‐state combatants, criminal soldiers, and the like. The stages, with OPFOR
examples applying to the above groups, are as follows:
Entrepreneurial. The OPFOR is in its early stages of development and is literally in the
process of ‘working out’ all of its processes and structures. The organization can rapidly
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change its course of behavior if required and tends to act in unexpected ways because
of its lack of organizational sophistication. This amateur component creates deadly
potential because many combatants are not inhibited by the ‘professional blinders’ of
more institutionalized OPFORs. This has been seen with the wave of terrorists that
emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s. This wave became professionalized to the extent
that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) firebreak developed. None of those OPFORs
chose to cross that firebreak. The new wave that emerged from the late 1980s through
the present has less inhibition about crossing the WMD firebreak, as witnessed by the
Aum Shinrikyo Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Hamas is representative of
a still entrepreneurial OPFOR and is currently in the process of solidifying its power base
in Gaza. Hamas cannot be bargained with or bought off and refuses to accept Israel’s
right to exist. In fact, it actively seeks Israel’s destruction as one of its religious duties.
Hamas leaders promote the purity of its mission and accept probable martyrdom as a
result of being targeted by the Israeli’s for assassination, thus placing the organization’s
needs above their own.
Instititutionalized. The OPFOR has matured to the point that it has its tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) standardized along with its organizational structure,
doctrine, training, logistics, and other functioning elements. Both Al Qaeda and
Hezbollah have pretty much reached this stage of their organizational existence with
Hezbollah having a far tighter span of control over its members. Al Qaeda, on the other
hand, contains many nodal hubs not fully under its central command. These OPFORs are
in sync with much of their affiliated population’s needs—these being radicalized Sunni
and Shia groups, respectively—with effective leaders that truly believe in their
organizational missions.
Ritualized. The OPFOR is no longer a smoothly functioning entity. Specific procedures
are undertaken because it has always been that way and a high level of organizational
dogma has developed where actions are taken and no longer questioned. Independent
thinking of the younger members of the organization is not tolerated and, when taken
to extremes, the group has become so corrupted that it does not care about the
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operational mission but rather the personal gain of those in offices of authority. An
example of the ritualized stage can be found with the Fatah terrorist group in the West
Bank and Gaza. It has become so corrupt over the decades of its existence that it has
lost control in Gaza to Hamas and is currently attempting to reform its institutions in the
West Bank. Leaders tend to be rigid, self‐aggrandizing, and care little about their
constituent populations.
Satirized. The OPFOR has become so dysfunctional as no longer to be a viable
combatant force. Actual operations, when attempted, take on almost a comical nature.
Either the mission is no longer valid or the OPFOR structure and function has become
fully obsolete. In either case, the OPFOR should no longer exist. Typically, in the case of
terrorist groups, the members are killed off or imprisoned long before entering this final
stage. The arrests, starting in 1999, of Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) members
provide a tragic story of individuals who have been on the run from the law for decades.
The very concept of a group such as the SLA still being active or attempting to field an
effective combatant force is so out of sync with current realities to the point of being
ludicrous.
The first and the second lifecycle stages are the most important, for this is when an
OPFOR has real combat capability. Entrepreneurial and institutionalized leadership roles are
very different from one another as learned in the business realm. Typically, a new corporation
is founded by an entrepreneur‐type leader. Once it grows beyond a certain point, however, a
different leader type is required to take the now mature company forward. Parallels exist in the
terrorist world as seen earlier with generations identified for the PIRA.
Exceptions also seem to exist. Of interest in this regard is the strange tale of the
Palestinian terrorist leader Yasser Arafat. As the original founder of Fatah in the late 1950s, he
is recognized as an entrepreneurial leader with a fanatical cult of personality developing around
him. His uncanny ability to hang on to both his life and power over the course of decades
allowed him to enter each of the four phases of his organization’s lifecycle as its leader. At his
high point, he sported a pistol while addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations
and, later, was even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. As time went on, the overall perception of
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Arafat as initially a dangerous terrorist and then as peacemaker changed to that of an impotent
old man whose actions were eventually viewed as both pathetic and comical in nature.

OPFOR Networks
OPFORs as entities committed to the mission of promoting their political, social, and
religious goals and end states by means of violence (i.e. conflict, terrorism, and war) organize
themselves in various ways. The following organizational types of OPFOR networks that exist
have been identified below:6
•

Hub (star or wheel). Fully centralized information flow. OPFOR Examples:
Terrorist Cell. Strength: Total centralized command and control of forces.
Weakness: Subject to decapitation strike.

•

Central and Subordinate Hubs (hierarchy). Partially centralized information flow.
OPFOR Example: Pre 9‐11 Al Qaeda model and Hezbollah. Strength: Centralized
command and control of forces. Weakness: Subject to decapitation strike,
potential slow reaction cycles with periphery of network.

•

Chain (line). Segmented information flow. Can represent one top down
informational path within a hierarchy but in this instance is used as a smuggler
chain where direct top down or center to periphery leadership authority does
not exist. OPFOR Example: Drug Smugglers. Strength: OPSEC (operational
security). Weakness: Information flow vulnerable to breakage and slow reaction
cycles.

•

Mesh (distributed/netlike). Partially decentralized information flow. OPFOR
Example: Post 9‐11 Al Qaeda model. Strength: Peripheral groups and clusters
take on command and control responsibilities and decapitation strike less
catastrophic. Weakness: Peripheral activities may be in variance to centralized
command and control operational plans and strategies.

•

All‐channel (fully connected/full‐matrix). Fully decentralized information flow at
all levels. OPFOR Example: Anarchists. Strength: Common operating picture,
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quick reaction cycles, swarming, and not subject to decapitation strikes.
Weakness: OPSEC (operational security).
•

No‐channel (nodes but no traceable connections). No tactical or operational
informational flow between nodes. OPFOR Example: Phineas Priests. Strength:
OPSEC (operational security). Weakness: No command and control of forces.

A more esoteric and self‐contained view on leadership and networks can be taken if
‘leaderless resistance’ thinking is incorporated.7 This body of OPFOR work seeks to challenge US
governmental authority by proposing an insurgent movement based on individual nodes
unconnected to one another. The network shares the same common vision and end state
desired but has no linkages between the individual nodes. This makes the OPFOR network
impervious to infiltration and compromise. The result would be each node functioning as a
combatant leader within its own self‐contained OODA loop. The Phineas Priests, a white
supremacist terrorist organization, promote a prime example of this form of leadership:
…the Priesthood operates in extreme secrecy and believes in ‘leaderless
resistance,’ tactics that ensure members escape detection and the organization
is protected from infiltration...the Phineas Priests is not a membership
organization in the traditional sense: there are no meetings, rallies or
newsletters. Rather, extremists become ‘members’ when they commit ‘Phineas
acts,’ any violent activity against ‘non‐whites.’8

It is of particular note that the Phineas Priests exist within an OPFOR network of no‐channel
nodes. That is to say, none of the nodes are physically connected to one another. This is
significant in and of itself, and does not appear to exist in past OPFOR network‐focused
literature.
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Al Qaeda is an interesting case because the pre‐ and post 9‐11 organizational models
based on central and subordinate hubs (hierarchy) and mesh (distributed/netlike) information
flows currently exist simultaneously, giving this OPFOR a unique duality. The old centralized
structure is attempting to reassert itself from safe havens in the tribal lands of Western
Pakistan. At the same time, spontaneous generation of Jihadi cell clusters in Europe and other
parts of the globe along with purposeful command and control decentralization to the
periphery help to extend its netlike nature. Al Qaeda name‐branding has also become
apparent, with affiliated groups in Iraq and Lebanon declaring their loyalty to the organization
and taking on its name. In many ways, Al Qaeda has become a network of networks with the
old guard having authority over one region of the network and affinity groups and outsiders
comprising other parts of it. To this mix should be added more than a few non‐channel nodes
representing lone wolf affinity adherents who engage in independent acts of violence much like
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Phineas Priests. The end result is some sort of hybrid semi‐mesh and hubs organizational
structure with some satellite no‐channel nodes:

• Semi‐mesh and hubs (hierarchy blended with distributed clusters) with some No‐
channel nodes. Partially centralized and decentralized information flow. Strength:
Centralized command and control of forces for part of the network and peripheral
groups; clusters take on command and control responsibilities. “Decapitation” strikes
less catastrophic for other parts of the network. Random no‐channel activities represent
some wild card potentials. Weakness: Part of the network subject to decapitation strike
and potential slow reaction cycles with periphery of network and part of the network
peripheral and satellite no‐channel activities may be in variance to centralized command
and control operational plans and strategies.
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Such an organizational structure would readily help to explain great leadership tensions
like those that existed between Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Al‐Zawahiri in their dealings with
self‐proclaimed Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi. Al‐Zarqawi engaged in a terror
campaign against Shia targets in Iraq that helped to turn Islamic public opinion against him and
push Iraq further towards fragmentation and civil war during the American occupation. It never
became clear if Al‐Zarqawi was acting as Bin Laden’s rogue lieutenant or his direct rival.
Although he had rebuffed some of Bin Laden’s earlier attempts at recruiting him, he still
conducted operations on his behalf as a contractor when it served his purposes. Ultimately, Al‐
Zarqawi boosted the Al Qaeda brand name by gaining it great levels of media attention by
means of his exploits and atrocities. At the global political level, however, he clearly had a
negative impact on Al Qaeda strategies by focusing on Shia instead of American targets,
thereby additionally straining Sunni and Shia relations.
Furthermore, this organizational structure with its no‐channel nodal elements would
help to explain the generation of wildcard acts of violence such as the DC sniper attacks, Los
Angeles International Airport El Al terminal shooting, and other Al Qaeda affinity based
incidents which straddles the lines between crime, delusional behavior, and quasi‐terrorism.9
Practical application of the theoretical insights gained from such new perceptions would
include a revisiting of the legal definition of conspiracy (such as that due to OPFOR no‐channel
nodal element coordination following the tenets of leaderless resistance) and a need to create
countermeasures to hostile meme emergence (for example the directive in the white
supremacist work The Hunter to kill interracial couples).

Research Implications
As discussed in this essay, a dynamic relationship exists between leaders and OPFOR
organizational structures. Important factors concerning this relationship from the leadership
side are the role and function of the leader. Key elements of this relationship from the
organizational side are OPFOR network type and where the OPFOR is in its evolutionary
process. Questions abound concerning whether OPFOR leaders naturally chose those roles and
functions or if they had those positions thrust upon them by circumstance, coercion, or chance.
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While organizational structures shape the role and functions of leaders (e.g. no dominant
leader will emerge in a no‐channel network), leaders affect the shaping of organizations
through control over initial organizational structure development and decisions regarding its
future evolution.
Leader intelligence and education may have a great deal of impact on OPFOR
capabilities, but pure meritocracy‐based organizations do not exist and those leaders that
achieve positions of power draw upon other advantages including financial resources, family
connections, patron and client relationships, natural charisma, and class privilege. It is well
noted that, given his background, Usama Bin Laden had many things going for him but, from
the perspective of sheer intellect, he functions on a much lower tier than many of his chief
officers and aides.
A typology of four different leadership forms exists in a loose relationship to OPFOR
organizational structures. The first type of leadership exists from a “tightly coupled”
perspective, that is, leadership derived from detailed instruction and control.10 These are direct
managers of violence who give specific orders to others and watch over them to ensure that
those directives are precisely carried out. These Direct Control Leaders are primarily found in
hub nodes that follow hierarchical and industrial processes based on tasks. The second and
third types of leadership exist due to variations pertaining to a “loosely coupled” perspective
wherein leadership is derived from individuals who share trust and knowledge.11
The second type of leadership seeks to transmits the commander’s intent to their
followers, who then seek to fulfill the mission. These Network Influence Leaders may be found
in hub nodes but may also be found in mesh and, to a lesser extent, still immature all‐channel
networks. Tolerance exists for the tasks undertaken to achieve this goal with some self‐
organizing behavior evident. Those directed take on the role of independent contractors more
than that of employees.
The third type of leadership is based on an even more extreme and evolved form of
decentralized control. These leaders exist in mesh and all‐channel networks that have
developed a network or collective vision. The commander’s intent is no longer required from a
leadership perspective. The nodal members each influence, and are influenced by, the network
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vision of the mission or end state. These Collective Vision Leaders may shift leadership roles to
engage in specialized activities and, if sufficiently evolved, have the capability to engage in
swarming behavior. To these entities, symbols of rank and authority are no longer required and
are generally ignored.
The fourth type of leadership is based on the Isolated Leader, who functions as a true
force‐of‐one. These leaders exist only in no‐channel networks that are decentralized as to
operate on the edge of chaos. Examples would be Phineas Priests and Al Qaeda affinity
members engaging in lone wolf behavior derived from the principles of ‘leaderless resistance’.
The desired higher end state or mission of the network is, however, derived in two completely
different ways. In the case of the Phineas Priests, a simple prime directive exists—to engage in
any violent activity against non‐whites. In the case of Al Qaeda no‐channel affinity node
members, the end state is transmitted by Network Influence Leaders such as Usuma Bin Laden
or Ayman al‐Zawahiri.
These four leadership types are mutually exclusive, except for the Direct Control Leaders
and the Network Influence Leaders, as the same individual can exhibit both forms of leadership.
A primarily example in this regard is Usama Bin Laden as the head of Al Qaeda. He has direct
command and control by means of the older centralized structure of the organization while at
the same time influencing the broader network containing peripheral mesh clusters and
satellite no‐channel nodes.
This typology of four different leadership forms should not be viewed as the final word
concerning leadership in OPFOR networks. Rather, its value is that of a starting point from
which to understand destructive and disruptive targeting schemes, group penetration and
intelligence gathering processes, network cooption and subversion, OPFOR evolution or de‐
evolution, and, ultimately, to gain a better understanding of how our own mesh and all‐channel
network structures are evolving. In order to understand these processes, real world OPFOR
data needs to be continually obtained and updated, network relationships visually
characterized, and the leadership forms applied.
Lessons learned from this endeavor will have direct bearing on future law enforcement
doctrinal, organizational, and technological requirements. While general law enforcement
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functions and structures would probably not at first benefit or be impacted, more specialized
units focused on counter‐terrorism, counter‐drug, and counter‐gang missions would be directly
influenced. Such units will find themselves, at times, directly pitted against organized OPFORs
rather than groups of disorganized individuals engaging in criminal activities. The insights
generated from OPFOR leadership analysis can also be applied to our own police leadership
typologies developed in this volume on police leadership and in other related works. This would
allow for a better critique of opposing and allied leadership models and possibly provide us
with a much more comprehensive understanding of both “good guy” and “bad guy” leadership
dynamics. The benefits provided would thus have broad law enforcement utility.

Endnotes
1. The best‐known work on the topic is probably Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror
Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) (see also Bunker & Begert, 2005; Krebs
2002).
2. Combat effectiveness can be measured in both destructive and disruptive ways. Central and
subordinate hubs structures (hierarchies) engage in industrial style destructive targeting
while mesh, all‐channel, and no‐channel structures engage in informational‐based
disruptive targeting strategies.
3. See Garfield (2005).
4. Sageman (2004), p. 75.
5. Ibid., pp. 75‐76.
6. This figure is a blending of Fig 1. Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed Networks in
Baran (1964) and Figure 1.1 Three Basic Types of Networks in Arquilla and Ronfeld (2001),
with additional modifications and additions by the author.
7. See Beam (1992).
8. Group Profile: Phineas Priests. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3244. Accessed November 19, 2007.
9. Debate exists concerning the use of leaderless resistance strategies by individuals influenced
by Al Qaeda ideology but with no organizational ties to the semi‐mesh and hubs network.
For a recent perspective see “The ‘Lone Wolf’ Theory and John Allen Muhammad.” MEMRI
Website. Special Dispatch Series No. 1772. November 21, 2007.
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD177207. Accessed November 21, 2007. Derived
from “The Islamist website www.ek‐ls.org, hosted by NOC4Hosts Inc., Tampa, FL, USA,
published, on November 19, 2007, a proposal by regular forum participant ‘Jihadi Salafi’ on
Al‐Qaeda’s possible use of a ‘lone wolf’ operative in the U.S. and/or the West.” p. 1.
10. See Atkinson and Moffat (2005).
11. Ibid.

135

References
Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (2005). Power to the edge: Command…control…in the Information
Age. Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program.
Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (Eds.). (1997). In Athena’s camp: Preparing for conflict in the
Information Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (Eds.). (2001). Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime,
and militancy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Atkinson, S.A. & Moffat, J. (2005). The agile organization: From informal networks to complex
effects and agility. Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program.
Baran, P. (1964). On distributed communications: I. Introduction to distributed
communications cetworks. Memorandum RM‐4320‐PR. United States Air Force Project
RAND. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Beam, L. (1992, February). Leaderless resistance. The Seditionist, 12. Accessed online
http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm.
Bunker, R. J. (2002, May 22‐23). Networked OPFORs: Strategic and operational considerations.
Presentation to Project O’Bannon, Event 4: Terrorist Networks: An Analysis. Quantico,
VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.
Bunker, R.J. & Begert, M. (2005). Operational combat analysis of the Al Qaeda network. In R.J.
Bunker (Ed.), Networks, terrorism and global insurgency (pp. 146‐169). London:
Routledge.
Don, B.W. et al. (2007). Network technologies for networked terrorists. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND.
Garfield, A. (2005). PIRA lessons learned: A model of terrorist leadership succession. In R.J.
Bunker (Ed.), Networks, terrorism and global insurgency (pp. 104‐114). London:
Routledge.
Krebs, V.E (2002). Mapping networks of terrorist cells. Connections, 24(3), 43‐52.
MacDonald, A. (1989). The hunter. Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books.
Murphy, P. (2004). The wolves of Islam: Russia and the faces of Chechen terrorism.
Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc.

136

Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Sullivan, J.P. (2003). Networked force structure and C4I. In R.J. Bunker (Ed.), Non‐state threats
and future wars (pp. 144‐155). London: Frank Cass, 2003.
Sullivan, J.P. & Bunker, R.J. (2005). Multilateral counter‐insurgency networks. In R.J. Bunker
(Ed.), Networks, terrorism and global insurgency (pp. 183‐198). London: Routledge.
von Clausewitz, C. (1976). On war. M. Howard & P. Paret, eds. and trans. New York: The Free
Press.

137

